Searching for Life Flight
Responders wade through fog & darkness to save fellow rescuers
By Martha Ellis

At 2100
Paramedic Kyle Lavender was working at Station 12Ñone of
the two Salt Lake City Fire DepartmentÕs

Fog had
reduced visibility near Station 12 to 10Ð15 feet. As bay doors rolled up the
firefighters couldnÕt see the end of the apron. Lavender recalls the eerie
sensation of driving across the taxiways as Station 12Õs crew headed across the
airfield. Units from Station
12included Red 1, a four wheel drive command unit manned by Captain Kevin
Adams, Red 5, an ARFF unit manned by Firefighter George Peck, Red 6, an ARFF
unit manned by Firefighters Dave Johnson and Andy Gomez, and Rescue 12, a four
wheel drive auxiliary manned by Kyle Lavender and Cameron Moore. ÒI remember
feeling almost suffocated by how thick the fog was,Ó Lavender said. ÒThere was
a real fear for us that we could actually run into an aircraft, because it was
so foggy.Ó Driving in a single file line, led by Captain Adams and instructions
from the tower, the crew made its way to the edge of airport property where the
tower believed the last point of contact occurred. The Life Flight helicopter
could have been anywhere in an estimated 6-square-mile area, based on the
bearings given to the pilot and best approximation of the individual manning
the radar screen.
By
2100hours, additional Salt Lake City Fire Department units dispatched to the
scene included Battalion Chief Wayne Edginton
(Battalion 2), Rescue Engine 11, manned by Captain Tom Pace, Engineer Bob
Shepherd, and Paramedics Glade Ridd and Otto Visser, Red 2, a command vehicle manned by Captain Steve Hermanson, and Red 3,an ARFF unit
manned by Keith Kennedy, all from Station 11, the second of the two Salt Lake City
FireÕs International Airport stations.
In the event of an airport emergency, the control tower has the ability
to open the dispatch speaker at
Airport radio-tower personnel believed their last point of
contact with Life Flight occurred when the helicopter was north of Interstate80
and west of the airport. The dense fog condition, compounded by the evening
darkness, made it extremely difficult to locate the helicopter. All of
the crews involved in the search did an excellent job of communicating their
intended search area to assure that resources were used to their greatest
advantage. Station 12Õs crew covered the west boundary of the airport,
utilizing an access road and the four-wheel drive units, Red 1 and the Rescue
12. ARFF units stayed on the road while Red 1 and Rescue 12 started at the
northwest corner of the airport property and worked their way south along the
west fence line. Station 11Õs crew
split up, Red 2 and 3 exited at 5600 West and headed
north based on the information given by the tower. Rescue 11 exited at4800 West and proceeded north as well, conducting a search on
foot of the fields to the north east of The International Center. Engine 9, manned by Captain
Brigham Darger and Engineer Dean Peterson, headed due east out of their station on Amelia Earhart drive, toward the east border of the International
Center, while Auxiliary 9, manned by Firefighters Leonard Iverson and
Vince Martinez took the four-wheel-drive grass wagon to perform an off-road
search toward the north east. Crews searched in fields and parking
lots for any sign of the craft, such as fire, strobe lights or engine noise. Atone point, Rescue 12 thought they had located the craft,
but realized they had discovered the lights and engines of a grounded aircraft.
Edginton established a command post in The International Center, just west of the airport. At 2105 hours Chief Edginton received information suggesting that the craft could be south of I-80.
Battalion Chief Mike Andrew, who worked as Battalion 1 that
night, heard the initial call for the downed helicopter on his handset and
proceeded toward the scene. Upon hearing the new location information, he began
to head west on I-80 to the 5600 West exit. He pulled his rig onto the over
pass facing the south. ÒI sat there for a minute, with my overhead lights on,
listening to the radio,Ó Andrew says. ÒI was trying to make sense of the area
which had already been covered, as far as the search, and was preparing to put
together a search team to begin working on the south side of I-80.Ó After
sitting there for a couple of minutes, a pair of headlights came out of the fog
from the south and stopped at AndrewÕs rig. The driver frantically rolled down
his window and asked Andrew, ÒAre you looking for a helicopter?Ó Andrew could
not believe the good fortune. ÒThese guys were a real godsend.Ó
The
driver stated that he and his passenger had heard a low flying helicopter and a
crash north of the warehouse where they had been working. The area they
described was just 1/4 mile south of AndrewÕs location. He immediately called
for emergency radio traffic, which is a radio designation reserving air traffic
for emergency communications only. Salt Lake City FD uses this form of
communication in the event of a mayday, or like incident emergency. Emergency
traffic clears airwaves when crucial information needs to be disseminated. In this case, there were many units
trying to gain information and give up-dates on their search when Andrew
received the critical search-altering tip. Command designated Andrew as South
Sector Operations Chief, and Rescue Engine 14 was dispatched as an additional
resource. At 2112 the command post
was moved from the north side of the freeway to the area of 150South and 5600 West. A unified command with Salt Lake City Fire, Salt Lake
City Police, the Utah Highway Patrol and Airport Security was established, with
Chief Edginton remaining as IC. All units slowly made
their way to the new command post. ÒThis was a terrible night,Ó recalls Edginton. ÒI was driving about 10 to 15 miles per hour and
could not even see the apparatus which was right in front of me.Ó
The road
north of the warehouse was not much of a road at allÑit was a poorly marked
gravel access to the fence line of the warehouse property. Andrew attempted to
mark the turn for incoming units, but had no means in his rig. One important
lesson learned: ÒThis really stressed the importance of carrying some type
of flare or portable strobe. The best I could do was to give a visual
description of the turnoff and hope others would find it,Ó Andrew said. At 2115
hours, as he turned east on the road, Andrew recalls reporting via radio that
he could smell aviation fuel in the air. ÒAs I drove down the road, I actually
had my head partially out of the window, following the smell of jet fuel.Ó
Farther down the road, Andrew ran into the workers who had
given him the tip on the craftÕs location. He tried to get more information
from the obviously rattled warehouse employees. ÒIÕm a lifelong resident of
The packed gravel road quickly changed as they drove. The
area had been subjected to truckloads of fill dirt, concrete blocks and other
debris that had been dumped there. ÒThis terrain would have been better suited
for a horse or mule, not a four-wheel drive vehicle,Ó recalls Andrew. ÒBut
somehow we made it out there, as it would turn out, to almost the exact
location that our crews eventually found the craft.Ó However, not knowing the
crash site was so close, Andrew turned back toward the dirt road to report to
two deputy chiefs waiting just north of the field. Andrew suggested deploying
the Salt Lake County Search and Rescue Team.
In the meantime, Auxiliary 9, manned by Firefighters
Martinez and Iverson, had arrived in area, and reported to South Sector
Command. Andrew sent them toward the area where he had picked up the heaviest
fuel smell. Three Salt Lake City police officers, Teresa McKinnon, James
Washington, and Barry Larsen, who had also had contact with the witnesses,
headed down the dirt road to assist in the search. Due to the rough terrain,
they opted to split up and head out on foot to cover more ground. They operated
almost completely by smell. ÒIt was a desperate, instinctual effort,Ó describes
McKinnon. ÒWe were running through the field, just following the smell of
fuelÓ. Mud, surplus canals and
barbed wire fences added to the challenge.
At 2128 Iverson had lost the scent of the fuel. ÒWe had only been
searching for a couple of minutes, when I realized that I could not smell the
fuel any longer,Ó recalls Iverson. ÒI radioed to
At the command post, representatives from several agencies
began to arrive, including the FAA and National Transportation Safety Board(NTSB), who had been notified by Airport Control. ÒAt
one point I turned around and there were two mechanics from Life Flight standing
behind me,Ó Edginton recalls. ÒThey had come over
from the airport hanger after being notified [about the crash].Ó Up until this
point, only Rescue 12 knew they were searching for a medical helicopter. Edginton, who has flown for AirMed
for several years, remembers his shock when he realized what they were looking
for. ÒI thought for sure it would be a local news or private helicopter,Ó he
said. ÒMedical helicopters rarely fly in conditions like this. I was able to
obtain valuable information about the helicopter and its crew from the
mechanics. Later, I utilized them to ensure that all the fuel pumps had been
shut off, and all electrical power to the craft had been disconnected.Ó
At 2129, about the time that
As fire personnel approached the aircraft, they were
shocked to see Life Flight wreckage, not a civilian helicopter.
Responders immediately began to triage and stabilize three patients.
The craft looked like it had almost fallen straight down out of the sky. All of the windows were blown out, and
the weight of the rotor and engine had compressed the passenger compartment. First Iverson ascertained that at least
one viable patient remained in the front left seat. ÒI remember looking at the
flight nurse, Stein Rosqvist, and having him look
directly back at me. He even tracked my movement as I walked past him, to assess
the other two victims, but he said nothing.Ó The pilot, Craig Bingham, seated
in the front right, and the flight medic, Mario W. Guerrero, seated in the
right rear of the craft, were both slumped over and none responsive. Iverson
reported the condition of the patients to incident command and requested help
with extrication.

The right side
of the craft had sustained more damage than the left. Iverson crawled in the rear window to
gain access to Guerrero while
Officers

The smell of jet fuel permeated the scene. ARFF unit Red
5was dispatched to the crash because the fire danger remained high. Red 5 was
selected because it is one of the lighter ARFF units, and the ground was
unstable.
When the
ambulance carrying Rosqvist made it back to the
pavement, several Utah Highway Patrol and Salt Lake City Police Department cars
waited to escort them to the hospital. Taking into consideration the condition
of the patient and the adverse weather, the police escort helped expedite the
transport. Lavender was one of the transporting paramedics. ÒI remember
thinking to myself at the time that it would have been nice to be able to get a
helicopter transport, when it dawned on me what a silly thought that was,Ó he
recalled. It reaffirms how much we rely on our brothers and sisters on the
medical helicopters and turn to them in some of our more dire situations. Lavender
initially reported to the hospital that their transport time was going to be
close to 30 minutes. ÒI remembered hearing the shock and dismay in the nurseÕs
voice taking the report. Everyone knew time was critical in SteinÕs outcome,Ó
he stated. The closest trauma center was the very hospital the helicopter had
left from over an hour earlier.
RosqvistÕs condition grew worse. Lavender and his partner, Cameron
Moore, began preparing for advanced life saving treatment, which they were
hoping they would not have to perform in the back of a bouncing ambulance. Rosqvist began developing a tension pneumothorax,
and emergency measures would have to be taken if he lost consciousness.
Lavender encouraged him as they made their way to the hospital. As they reached
the metro area, Lavender was surprised and pleased to see that the police had
every intersection between the freeway and the hospital secured and clear for
their passage. They never had to hit the brakes, which saved valuable time.
When Rosqvist had been safely
handed over to the anxiously awaiting trauma team of
Trying to
articulate the effect a call like this has on the rescuers is not easy. Its
impact was profound. We have dedicated our lives to serving and protecting the
citizens of our communities. When the tables are turned, however, and we are
faced with saving our own, our proverbial ÒshieldsÓ are stripped. We move into
a form of autopilot in order to do what is necessary to complete the task at
hand, but what happens after the adrenalin dissipates.
ÒI was deeply disturbed by this call. I have never had a
call effect me this way,Ó recalls McKinnon. ÒMy department did provide some
critical incident stress debriefing, which helped some.Ó It was not until a
week later, however, when McKinnon received a call
from Lavender asking her if she would like to go to the hospital to visit Rosqvist that things changed for her. ÒWhen I saw him laying
there in bed, with his children sleeping next to him, with normal skin color
and clean clothes on, I finally thought, ÔIÕm going to be okay with this now.ÕÓ
Could anything have been done differently to change the
outcome of this call to a more favorable one? Chief Edginton
does not believe so. ÒWe were only 10Ð15 minutes into the search when the tip
came in that the helicopterÕs location was likely to the south of the
Interstate, near 5600West. Things were really clicking along, and we felt like
we were closing in on the helicopter. Had we received no leads and been unable
to find the craft, we would have called for thermal imaging. IÕm not sure if
that would have been effective in the fog, however. The ARFF units have them,
and they were not working that night.Ó The firefighters who man the apparatus
carrying those units for
At
the time, there was a great deal of frustration with trying to locate the
helicopter. In reality it was truly amazing given the circumstances that it did
not take longer.
Two
key elements that led to the expedient recovery of this helicopter. First, a
vast amount of territory was searched in a short amount of time. Everyone did
their part to fan out their resources to cover more ground. By venturing
further west, Chief Andrew allowed the witnesses to locate him, saving rescuers
a tremendous amount of time.
Second,
and most important, was the implementation the Incident Command System. This
provided a smooth transition to a unified command as other agencies became
involved and, given the intense nature of the call, allowed for communications
to be channeled through a central command. ÒEven though emotions and anxiety
levels increase when doing our jobs in these circumstances, if we follow our IC
procedures and utilize proper radio communications we get through these
incidents,Ó Andrew says.
ÒWe would be negligent as incident
commanders if we didnÕt have a thorough understanding of these procedures or
have them in place in our individual departments,Ó Andrew says. ÒWe need to
practice and drill on mass casualty incident responses, utilizing our
Properly utilizing these valuable tools allowed rescuers to pinpoint the location of this disaster and communicate the need for resources at the scene. In this case, it saved a life.